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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes a model of joint product smuggling which 
explicitly examines the roles of uncertainty, enforcement, taxes, 
and the magnitude of a real resource cost in determining the 
firm's decision to smuggle and smuggling's impact on welfare and 
tax revenue collection. A framework is presented in which: 1) 
the tax rate, 2) the level of government enforcement, and 3) the 
real resource cost are analyzed to determine their impact on a 
firm's decision to smuggle or engage in strictly legal trade. 
The results derived in the paper indicate that the implied policy 
solution for the smuggling problem arrived at in the earlier 
literature of "the less smuggling the better" is at best 
misleading. 
1 All correspondence should be directed to Scott 
Fausti, Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, South 
Dakota state University, Scobey Hall, Box 504A, Brookings, 
south Dakota 57007-0895. 
I. Introduction. 
The smuggling of imports and exports is a common phenomenon 
for lesser developed countries when high tariff or export tax 
rates are levied on traded goods. Smuggling therefore raises 
several serious economic issues concerning social welfare and 
trade tax polices for lesser developed countries. A literature 
review of these issues by Bhagwati (1981) reveals that the 
economic consequences for the interact�on of government 
enforcement with smuggling have not been rigorously analyzed with 
respect to trade tax revenues and welfare. 
In this essay the above issues are addressed. The starting 
point of the paper is the modification of Pitt's (1981) model of 
joint product export smuggling. The modification allows the 
incorporation of active government enforcement of the smuggling 
laws. Active enforcement is the assumption used to introduce 
uncertainty into the model. 1 The results of the model indicate 
that: 1) joint product smuggling does not have a strictly 
negative impact on welfare as compared to the non-smuggling case, 
2) increased enforcement against smuggling does not have a 
strictly positive effect on welfare, 3) smuggling•s impact on tax 
revenue collection is ambiguous, and 4) the presence of joint 
product smuggling reduces the revenue maximizing tariff rate. 
1 It is assumed that enforcement effort against smuggling 
incurs a zero real resource cost. This is a reasonable assumption 
if one assumes that increased enforcement effort against smuggling 
only requires a reallocation of resources within the legal system. 
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II. Assumptions. 
The paper begins with the basic assumptions of Pitt's model 
of smuggling. Pitt assumes the small country case with the terms 
of trade fixed. The country produces two traded goods, an 
exportable (X) and an importable (M), employing primary factors 
purchased in competitive markets. Production and trade are 
carried out by identical firms. Domestic production is subject to 
diminishing returns. Legal and illegal trade in exports is 
carried out by the same firm. The law of one price holds in the 
domestic economy. 
The following additional assumptions are made so that a 
model of smuggling incorporating uncertainty can be developed: 1) 
firms that smuggle do incur a significant real smuggling cost; 2 
2) smugglers (firms) are natives and therefore their utility 
functions are embodied in the country's social welfare function; 
3) export taxes are assumed to be non-prohibitive; 4) firms must 
bear the risk of illegal activity and they cannot insure against 
criminal penalties; 5) exporting firms have a choice between 
strictly legal trade or smuggling, with the choice based on 
profit maximization; 6) firms are risk neutral; and 7) if the 
domestic exporting firm decides to smuggle, it will then produce 
a joint product, and legal trade will act as a cloak for the 
firm's illegal activity. The firm can use four methods to 
smuggle exports: a) under-invoicing of exports, b) falsely 
2 Cooper (1974), and Deardorff and Stolper (1990) argue that 
smuggling may not impose any significant real cost on society over 
legal trade. 
declared exports, c) under-assessment of exports, and d) 
clandestine smuggling of unreported production. 3 
III. A Joint Product Model of Smuggling. 
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In addition to the assumptions made in the previous section, 
it is assumed each firm can trade illegally according to a 
modified Pitt smuggling function, 
s* = GCL, S) . Cl) 
The variable cs*) is the quantity of good CX) made ready to 
be smuggled. The variable cs*) in this model is defined as 
exports made ready for smuggling across the domestic border or, 
in other words, smuggling attempted. The variable CL) is the 
quantity of good CX) legally traded and CS) is the quantity of 
good CX) input into smuggling activity. The function CG) is 
strictly concave and a twice differentiable linear homogeneous 
function. The function CG) is assumed to have the following 
properties: 
Gi � o, Gu :S o, 
1 � G. � 0, G.. :S O, 
GCO, S) =O, 
GCL, O) =O, 
s-s• � o, acs-s·> aL < 0, 
acs-s·> 
as > 0· 
C2) 
CJ) 
C4) 
CS) 
(6) 
3 Deardorff and Stolper C1990) discuss the widespread use of 
smuggling method Cd) in a number of African countries. 
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Assumption (2) states that the marginal product of legal 
trade used in smuggling is non-negative and is declining in (L). 
Assumption (3) states that a unit increase in the smuggling input 
(S) results in a positive but less than unit increase in actual 
amount of the export made ready to be smuggled, and the marginal 
product of (S) is declining. Assumption (4) states that legal 
trade is a necessary input into smuggling or the probability of 
detection is one. Assumption (5) states that firms can choose to 
engage in legal trade only. Assumption (6) prohibits the real 
resource cost of smuggling from being negative. The real resource 
cost of smuggling (s-s*) is the smuggler's selling cost in excess 
of legal trade selling cost. 4 It is assumed that the actual 
magnitude of smuggling•s real resource cost is exogenous to the 
model. However, a change in one of the endogenous variables, (L) 
or (S), affects the marginal resource cost of smuggling. A one­
unit increase in (L), ceteris paribus, reduces the marginal real 
resource cost of smuggling. A one-unit increase in (S), ceteris 
paribus, increases the marginal real resource cost of smuggling. 
In the literature, smuggling•s ambiguous welfare effect is 
the direct result of how the real resource cost assumption is 
4 The excess selling cost is the consequence of firms engaging 
in cloaking activity to conceal illegal exports. Martin and 
Panagariya (1984), Thursby (1991), and Fausti (1992) also used this 
type of approach to generate the real resource cost associated with 
smuggling in their papers. 
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modeled. 5 A negative welfare effect results from an excessive 
real resource cost incurred by smugglers, while an insignificant 
real resource cost produces a positive welfare effect. 6 As an 
example, Pitt assumes that the cost of smuggling is composed of 
either penalties and confiscation or a mixture of a real resource 
cost and penal�ies and confiscation. His welfare result is 
ambiguous because the composition of the cost mix is unknown. 
Pitt's assumption is altered and it is assumed that the 
difference between (S) and (S*) is a real resource cost incurred 
from the use of cloaking tactics employed to evade detection. 7 
Smuggling is assumed to incur a risk of detection (p), 
(l�p�O) such that (p=l) if (L=O). The expected value of illegal 
goods intercepted as they are moved over the border is (p•Pf•S*) 
or (Pf•S*) if (L=O). The variable (Pf) is the world price of 
exports. The expected value of successful smuggling is [(1-
p)Pf•S*]. The variable (F) is a multiple of the value of 
intercepted illegal goods which is imposed as a fine, (F�l). The 
expected cost of interception to the smuggler is (p•F•Pf•S*) and 
5 For example see the papers by Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), 
Pitt (1981), Martin and Panagariya (1984), Sheikh (1989), Schollr 
(1989), Thursby (1991), and Faust! (1992). 
6 The result of the welfare effect being dependent on the 
magnitude of the real resource cost is what Pitt and Bhagwati and 
Hansen refer to as the ambiguous welfare result attributed to 
smuggling. 
7 The real resource cost, for example, may take the form of: 
1) special packing cost necessary to hide smuggled goods, and 2) 
the transport cost of shipping unreported production out of the 
country via clandestine ports. 
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is at least (Pt•s*) if (L=O). Expected smuggling revenue net of 
interception cost is equal to [(1-p•F)•Pt•s*] and is non-positive 
if (L=O). 
The expected value of output price per unit of smuggled good 
at the border for the smuggling firm is E [P•] = (1-p•F)•Pt and is 
non-positive if (L=O). The expected value of revenue per input 
unit of the smuggled good at the border for the smuggling firm is 
E [P•]·(S*/S) = (1-p•F)•Pt•(S*/S) and is non-positive if (L=O). The 
expected value for the output price per unit of legally exported 
goods is E [P1] = pt•(l-t) = pL and represents the legal tax 
distorted price for exports. The variable (t) denotes the ad 
valorem export tax. It is assumed the firm knows the values of 
these risk factors. 
It is assumed each firm has a decision to make. The firm 
can engage in joint product smuggling or it can sell its output 
at the legal domestic export tax distorted price (P1), as implied 
by the assumption G(L,0)=0. 8 If the firm decides to smuggle, it 
receives the weighted average price for its total output. 
If the firm decides to become involved in joint product 
illegal trade, then its situation can be thought of as a lottery. 
The expected value of the lottery is dependent on variables 
(p, y•, F). The probability of apprehension (p) is determined by 
the government. It is assumed the firm's probability of being 
caught is (p) if it engages in cloaking activities. If it does 
8 strictly legal trade profits are derived from equation (7) 
when it is assumed S=O. 
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not cloak its illegal activity, then the probability of 
apprehension is equal to one. The variable (F) determines the 
monetary equivalent of the punishment imposed on the firm by the 
government if the firm is caught in the illegal act of smuggling. 
Fines are considered a transfer to the government. As in Pitt's 
paper, profit maximization in production implies producing on the 
production possibility curve where the marginal rate of 
transformation equals domestic relative prices (P*) . The 
variable (Y8 ) represents profits from joint product export trade. 
Smugglers are assumed to be profit maximizers. Expected 
profit for the smuggling firm is given by equation (7) , 
E (Y8) =Pf•G (L, S) - (p) •F•Pf•G (L, S) + pf. (1-t) •L - p*. (L+S) •9 (7) 
The term [Pf•G (L, S) - (p) •F•Pf•G (L, S) ] denotes expected 
smuggling revenues; pf• (l-t) •L represents revenues for legal 
trade. As in Pitt's article, firms earn zero economic profit in 
the long run. Setting equation (7) to zero and solving for p* 
generates an expression for the long-run equilibrium domestic 
price ratio as a weighted average of prices received for goods 
legally exported in conjunction with goods illegally exported: 
p• = (1-p·F) .p
f·(S*) pf·(l-t) ·(L) 
(L+S) 
+ 
(L+S) . 
( 8) 
The exporting firm's decision of whether to engage in 
strictly legal trade (S=O) or engage in smuggling and produce a 
joint product (L+S*) will determine the long-run equilibrium 
9 The first and second order conditions can be found in 
appendix (A) . 
domestic price ratio (DPR). If firms smuggle, then Pitt's "price 
disparity" result is generated: p* > pL. 
IV. The Firm's Decision Mechanism 
In the economic literature on uncertainty, it has been 
established that a risk neutral firm confronted with uncertainty 
will make its profit maximization decision as if it were 
operating in a certainty environment. 10 Joint product illegal 
trade profit represents an uncertain prospect and legal trade 
represents a certain prospect. The firm's decision to engage in 
joint product smuggling (L+S*) or engage in strictly legal trade 
(L) is based on a comparison of expected profits from joint 
product smuggling to profits earned from strictly legal trade. 
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The firm's decision will determine the domestic price ratio. 
If the firm to engages in joint product smuggling or strictly 
legal trade, it does so based on the following decision criteria 
condition statement: 
where (p•F) is the expected value of punishment. 11 Condition 
(9) leads to the first proposition of the paper: 
1° For a discussion of the behavior of a competitive firm 
operating under uncertainty see Hey (1979). 
11 Condition (9) is derived from equation (8). Condition (9) 
makes a comparison of revenue coming from illegal trade (Pt•s*•(l­
p•F)) to the revenue which would be earned by channeling illegal 
goods through legal channels, (Pf•S•(l-t)). 
PROPOSITION 1. IL the Lirm receives a higher price via joint­
product smuggling, then all Lirms will smuggle and Pitt's price 
disparity phenomena will result. 
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To establish proposition 1, the implications of condition 
(9) are examined. Condition (9) states that if the eXPected 
value of revenue per input unit of smuggled good is greater than 
the per unit revenue that could be earned by selling (S) through 
legal channels, then all firms smuggle and DPR=P*. If not, then 
DPR=pL. The following statements outline the firm•s decision 
mechanism for engaging in joint product smuggling or the strictly 
legal trade alternative: 
if (S*+s) •(1-p•F) < (1-t), then S=O, DPR is pL, 
if (s*+S)•(l-p•F) > (1-t), then S>O, DPR is p*, 
if (S*+S) •(1-p•F) = (1-t), 
then indeterminate, DPR is pL:p*. 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
Under the assumption of risk neutrality and a real cost 
associated with smuggling (s-s*), the domestic price ratio is 
determined by the higher of the legal and illegal trade prices. 
Equations (11) and (12) state that the firm•s decision to smuggle 
or engage in strictly legal trade is dependent on that 
comparison. Equation (13) states that the coexistence of legal 
trade only firms eXPorting (L) with firms that smuggle (joint 
product eXPorts) can only occur when the combined value of 
eXPected punishment and the real resource cost equals the eXPort 
tax. Thus, condition (12) above establishes proposition 1. This 
model, unlike other models found in the previous literature, 
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requires the smuggling fira to account for the real resource cost 
it incurs in its output price structure and thus aake it a 
contributing factor in the fira•s decision to smuggle. 
v. The Effect of Enforcement, Taxes, and the Taras of Trade on 
Smuggling Activity. 
In this section a comparative static analysis is conducted. 
The analysis examines the effect of changes in enforcement 
activity, taxes, and the teras of trade on smuggling activity and 
the domestic price ratio. The comparative static results are then 
used in the analysis of how changes in these exogenous variables 
affect total exports, tax revenue collection, and social welfare. 
Beginning with the affect of a change in enforcement: 
PROPOSITION 2. In the presence of smuggling, increasing the 
monetary penalty or the probability of detection will: 1) reduce 
legal and illegal exports; 2) have a strictly negative effect on 
the DPR; and 3) have an ambiguous effect on the real resource 
cost of smuggling. 
To establish proposition 2, the comparative static results 
derived in appendices (B&C) are examined: aLJap <O, asJap <O, 
aLJaF <O, as/aF <O, aP*Jap <O, aP*/aF <O. What is interesting 
about the comparative static results is that they are counter 
intuitive. One would noraally expect increased enforcement to 
reduce illegal exports and increase legal exports. However, this 
result is attributed to the nature of joint product smuggling in 
conjunction with declining average export prices as enforcement 
activity increases. 12 
11 
With respect to the real resource cost of smuggling, an 
increase in either enforcement instrument (p or F) has an 
ambiguous effect on cs-s*), via the negative effect enforcement 
has on (L) and (S), as equation (6) indicates. This result is in 
contrast to the positive effect (increased cost) derived in the 
paper by Martin and Panagariya. The ambiguous effect derived 
here results from increased enforcement reducing smuggling, which 
reduces the total real resource cost. But at the same time, 
increased enforcement reduces legal trade, which reduces the 
protection from detection and requires smugglers to increase 
cloaking activities. It is the cloaking activities that generate 
the real resource cost in this paper. The above discussion 
establishes proposition 2. 
The next issue is the affect of an increase in the export 
tax: 
PROPOSITION 3. In the presence of smuggling, increasing the 
export tax will: 1) reduce legal and illegal exports; 2) have a 
strictly negative effect on the DPR; and 3) have an ambiguous 
effect on the real resource cost of smuggling. 
12 The results derived for the effect of changes in 
enforcement activity on smuggling and the domestic price ratio are 
consistent with the literature. Martin and Panagariya (1984), 
Sheikh (1989), Thursby (1991), and Fausti (1992) all show that 
increased enforcement has a negative effect on smuggling volume and 
the domestic price ratio. However, the effect of increased 
enforcement on legal trade volume has been addressed in the papers 
by Martin and Panagariya, and Thursby. The former derived an 
ambiguous result and the latter a positive result. 
To establish proposition 3, the comparative static results 
derived in appendices (B&C) are examined: aL/at <0, as/at <O, 
aP*/at <O. These results are counter intuitive with respect to 
smuggling activity. One would expect smuggling effort to 
12 
increase as the export tax rises, however, since legal trade is a 
necessary input into smuggling, as legal exports decline, export 
smuggling declines. 13 The tax increase has an ambiguous effect 
on smuggling•s real resource cost and this result can be 
explained in a manner similar to the enforcement discussion. The 
above discussion establishes proposition 3. 
The next issue is the affect of an increase in the world 
price of exports: 
PROPOSITION 4. In the presence oL smuggling, an increase in p! 
will: 1) increase legal and illegal exports; 2) have a strictly 
positive eLLect on the DPR; and 3) have an ambiguous eLLect on 
the real resource cost oL smuggling. 
To establish proposition 4, the comparative static results 
derived in appendices (B&C) are examined: aL/apf >O, as/apf >O, 
aP*/aPf >O. In the presence of smuggling, the comparative static 
results demonstrate that if the terms of trade (Pf) improve, 
which implies the world price of exports increase, the amount of 
13 The results derived above for the effect of an increase 
in the tax rate on smuggling, legal trade, and the domestic price 
ratio are in contrast to the results found in the earlier 
literature. Sheikh (1989) , and Fausti (1992) demonstrate that an 
increase in the tax rate does increase the volume of smuggling and 
has a negative effect on the domestic price ratio. However, these 
authors do not address the issue of the effect on legal trade 
volume. The results found in the paper by Martin and Panagariya 
show an ambiguous effect on smuggling volume and a negative effect 
on legal trade volume. 
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(X) produced for illegal trade (S) and the amount for legal trade 
(L) for the smuggling firm increase. The (DPR) will rise and 
total exports will increase, which will increase total tax 
revenues. The effect on (s-s*), however, is ambiguous. This 
contrasts with the results found in the paper by Martin and 
Panagariya. In their paper, the real resource cost is 
independent of the terms of trade; and thus, an increase in the 
terms of trade has no·effect on the real resource cost. The 
above discussion establishes proposition 4. 
VI. The Effect of Joint Product Smuggling on Total Exports and 
Trade Tax Revenues. 
Expanding on the work by Johnson (1974), Pitt (1981), 
Deardorff and Stolper (1990), and Fausti (1992), this section 
will examine the effect of joint product smuggling on export 
production and tax revenue collection. In this section an 
additional assumption is made: that the exported good (X) is a 
pure export. 14 
The first issue addressed in this section is the impact of 
the introduction of joint-product smuggling on total exports, 
legal exports and tax revenue collection: 
PROPOSITION s. The introduction of joint-product smuggling will: 
1) increase total export production; and 2) have an ambiguous 
effect on legal exports. Thus, the introduction of joint product 
smuggling has an ambiguous effect on tax revenue collection. 
14 A pure export good implies that there is no domestic 
consumption of that good. 
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To establish proposition 5, the analysis begins with the question 
of how the introduction of joint product smuggling affects total 
export production, denoted (X) . The small country assumption 
made earlier implies that the demand for exports is perfectly 
elastic. The level of export production is therefore determined 
by supply. Assuming that the level of total export production, 
after the export tax is levied but before smuggling is 
introduced, is equal to L1 , 
X1 = L1• (14) 
After smuggling is introduced, the level of total export 
production is equal to the sum of legal and illegal exports, 
X2 = Lz + S2• (15) 
Assuming the supply of total exports has a positive relationship 
with the price of exports, one would expect that whenever (P* � 
pL) ,  then (X2 � Xi) .  Given that (S2 � O) , then Lz + S2 � X11 or 
equivalently, S2 � X1 - L2• Using (14) , this implies condition 
(16) , 
(16) 
Equation (16) demonstrates that the production of exports 
destined to be marketed via illegal channels is greater than the 
change in the production of exports destined to be marketed via 
legal channels. However, as in Pitt's paper, it can not be 
determined if the amount of X marketed via legal trade channels 
increases or decreases. Therefore, the affect of smuggling on 
export tax revenues is ambiguous. 15 The above discussion 
establishes proposition 5. 
Changing the assumptions again, assume that the export tax 
is set to maximize revenues collected before joint product 
smuggling begins. since it is assumed that country produces a 
pure export good, domestic consumption can be ignored. Domestic 
production and thus export supply is assumed to be solely 
dependent on the exogenous world price for the exported good. 
Any ad valorem tax levied on exports must be fully absorbed by 
domestic producers. Given this set of circumstances, it is 
assumed that legal export supply is actually a function of the 
export tax L(t), ceteris paribus. 16 The government's total 
revenue function is defined as, 
L'<O, L'=dL/dt. (17) 
15 
The sign for L' is taken from appendix B. Total tax revenue is 
defined as revenue collected on exports evaluated at world 
prices. To determine the revenue maximizing tax rate, the first 
15 Fausti (1992) used this approach to discuss the impact of 
smuggling on total exports. Pitt (1981), and Deardorff and Stolper 
(1990) also derive ambiguous results for the effect of the 
introduction of smuggling on legal trade. They indicate that the 
introduction of smuggling could actually increase tax revenue 
collected. In the paper by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973), the 
introduction of strictly clandestine smuggling has a strictly 
negative effect on revenue collected from a given tariff rate. 
16 If one assumes that legal trade is a function of the 
domestic price of exports, L(P), and P = pt. (1-t), the results 
remain unaltered. The decision to make legal trade a function of 
the tax was done to simplify the mathematics presented in the 
paper. 
derivative (dTR/dt) is derived and set to zero in equation (18) 
and the revenue maximizing tax rate is given in equation (19) , 
t0 = - (L/L') >O. 
(18) 
(19) 
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When joint product smuggling is introduced, the government's 
total revenue function is altered in the following manner, 
TR = t•Pf•L (t, S) + p•F•Pt•G (L, S) , S'<O, S'=dS/dt. (20) 
Notice that TR is now also a function of confisication revenues. 
The legal export supply function (L) is altered so that legal 
exports are a function of t and s. The illegal export supply 
function is denoted G (L, S) .  The paritial derivitive aLJas 
capatures the affect of the introduction of smuggling on legal 
exports. From the discussion above its sign was determined to be 
ambigous. The signs for L' and S' are assumed to be consistent 
with those derived in appendix B. Following the same procedure 
as above, the revenue maximizing tax rate is derived, 
dTR/dt = pf.L + pf•t• [L'+aL/as·S'] + 
pf• p • F • [ Gi_ • L' + Gi_ • a L/ a S • S' + Gs• S' ] = 0, ( 21) 
t1 = -{ (L + p•F• [Gi,•L' + Gi,•aL/aS•S' + G8•S'] ) } / 
{L' + aL,aS•S'} >O. (22) 
Equation (22) brings the discussion to proposition 6: 
PROPOSITION 6. The introduction of joint-product smuggling will 
reduce the revenue maximizing tax rate if aL;asso, and have an 
ambigous effect if aL/aS>O. 
To establish proposition 6, the ratio of t1/t0 is examined under 
the following assumptions: 1) aLJas =O; 2) aLJas <0; and 3) 
17 
aL/as >O. If the ratio is less than one, then revenue maximizing 
tax rate is lower when there is smuggling activity. If the ratio 
is greater than one, then the revenue maximizing tax rate is 
higher when there is smuggling activity. In appendix (D) it is 
demonstrated that when the introduction of smuggling has no 
effect on legal exports i. e. , aL/as =O, the ratio t1/t0 <1. If it 
is assumed that the introduction of smuggling reduces legal 
exports (aL/as <O), then the ratio is again less than one. If it 
is assumed that the introduction of smuggling increases legal 
exports (aL/as >O), then the ratio is positive but its magnitude 
is ambiguous. However, if the contribution of confiscation 
revenues to total revenues (TR) is small, then t1/t0 > 1. The 
implication for this case is that the revenue maximizing tax rate 
increases in the presences of smuggling. The results derived in 
appendix (D) establish proposition 6. 17 The policy implication 
for lesser developed countries which employ trade taxes as a 
revenue raising device is that they may over or under estimate 
the tax rate necessary for revenue maximization if smuggling and 
enforcement levels are not accounted for in their calculations. 
VII. Smuggling, Enforcement and Taxes: The Welfare Implications. 
The real resource cost of smuggling in this model is equal 
to pt. (s-s*) and represents the total welfare loss associated 
17 This set of results extends the discussion by Johnson 
(1974) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973) on how the introduction 
of smuggling effects the revenue maximizing tax rate. 
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with smuggling. The negative welfare effect can be divided into 
two parts: 1) a negative effect on prices and production; and 2) 
a loss in government revenue. The negative price effect is 
internalized by the smuggling firm and is reflected in the firm's 
output price. The welfare loss due to a real resource cost not 
accounted for in the smuggling firm's output price is the value 
of lost government confiscation revenues that would have accrued 
if cs-s*=o) . The welfare loss not accounted for by the firm can 
be considered a dead weight loss to society (OWL) and it is equal 
to: OWL= (p·F) ·Pt· (s-s*) . The overall welfare effect of 
smuggling depends on whether the positive welfare effect of an 
improvement in domestic relative prices due to the introduction 
of smuggling outweighs the negative welfare effect of the dead 
weight loss. 
A comparison of the welfare level attained when "all firms 
smuggle" to the welfare level attained when "all firms engage in 
strictly legal trade" can be determined by answering two 
question: 1) what effect does smuggling have on the domestic 
price ratio? and 2) is the change in the total value of exported 
goods smuggled greater than the total value of those exports if 
they were shipped through legal channels instead?. The first 
question is answered by equations (11) through (13) : smuggling 
will only occur if (P*�pL) . The second question can be answered 
by first assuming (P*>pL) ; then, by rearranging equation (10) the 
following condition (23) results, 
pt.s*• (l-p•F) - Pt•S• (l-t) > O. (23) 
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Condition (23) states that if (P*>pl,), then the smuggling firm 
receives a higher total value for its exports by engaging in 
illegal trade. The firm, however, does not consider the (OWL) to 
society generated by the real resource cost associated with 
smuggling. In order for smuggling to increase the total social 
value of exports (welfare) in comparison to the strictly legal 
trade alternative, condition (24) must be met, 
pt. s*· (1-p•F) - pt. g. (1-t) - (p·F) .pt. (s-s*) > o. (24) 
Condition (24) reduces to condition (25), which can be considered 
the income effect attributed to smuggling when smuggling incurs a 
real resource cost, 
(S*+S)-(p•F) > (1-t). (25) 
In comparing condition (25) to equation (12), it is clear that 
(25) is the stronger condition. This implies it is possible for 
smuggling to cause a decline in the total social value of 
exports. The above analysis demonstrates that smuggling can 
reduce the social value of exports if condition (25) is not met. 
An analysis of the social welfare effect of smuggling, however, 
must also consider the effect smuggling has on the domestic price 
ratio. For this purpose an indirect utility function (V) is 
introduced and it is assumed it can be used as a proxy for the 
social welfare function. Assume welfare is a function of the 
domestic price ratio (DPR) and income (Y). 18 Assume income is 
positively related to the total social value of exports. The 
18 Under the assumption of risk neutrality, income is an 
appropriate proxy for welfare. 
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total social value of exports includes both private and public 
sector revenues generated by the export trade. Assume all other 
income sources are held constant and enforcement effort does not 
incur a real resource cost. Under these assumptions the indirect 
utility function is defined as V (DPR, Y) , and has the following 
properties i av/ aDPR>O I av/ aY>O • 19 
The discussion above leads to the next proposition in the 
paper: 
PROPOSITION 7. The welfare effect of introducing joint-product 
smuggling can not be strictly negative or all smuggling will end. 
To establish proposition 7, the condition given in equation 
(12) must first be satisfied. This implies that firms will 
smuggle. The welfare effect of smuggling will be positive if 
condition (25) is met. This is due to the fact that the change 
in domestic price ratio and the change in the total social value 
of exports are both positive. The welfare effect of smuggling, 
however, is ambiguous if condition (25) is not met. This 
ambiguous result is the consequence of the (DPR) increasing, 
while (Y) declines. The ambiguous result derived above provides a 
stronger argument in the favor of smuggling than the ambiguous 
welfare results obtained by Bhagwati and Hansen and Pitt. Their 
ambiguous welfare results are the consequence of smuggling either 
19 The indirect utility function (V) has the following 
properties: 1) (V) is continuous at all DPR>O, and Y>O; 2) (V) is 
non-decreasing in (DPR) and (Y) ; and 3) (V) is homogenous of degree 
zero in (DPR) and (Y) . It should be noted that an increase in the 
(DPR) implies an improvement in domestic relative prices. For a 
discussion of the properties of indirect utility functions see 
Varian (1984) . 
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having a strictly positive or strictly negative effect on welfare 
depending on the magnitude of the real resource cost. Given that 
the magnitude of the real resource cost is unknown in their 
papers they conclude that the welfare effect is ambiguous. In 
this paper smuggling does not have a strictly negative effect on 
welfare. The welfare effect is strictly positive or ambiguous 
when the real resource cost is excessive. In the joint product 
model, smuggling activity will become indeterminate or end before 
the welfare effect of smuggling becomes strictly negative. Thus 
proposition 7 is established. Furthermore, unlike their 
analysis, this paper provides the mathematical conditions 
necessary for a positive or an ambiguous welfare result to 
occur. 20 
The next issue to be addressed is the affect of a change in 
the level of enforcement on welfare: 
PROPOSITION 8. The welfare effect of increased enforcement is 
strictly negative when the welfare effect of smuggling is 
strictly positive. 
To establish proposition 8, the affect of increased 
enforcement is examined below. Proposition 2 established that 
increasing either (p) or (F) causes a decline in Land S and the 
DPR. If smuggling is not eliminated, then the total social value 
of exports under the smuggling regime declines, as indicated by 
equation (25). This establishes proposition 8. 
20 As in the paper by Deardorff and Stolper, the welfare 
effect of smuggling in this model is strictly positive, if 
smuggling does not incur a real resource cost. 
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The last issue to be addressed is the affect of an increase 
in the tax rate on welfare: 
PROPOSITION 9. The welfare effect of an increase in the tax rate 
is strictly negative. 
To establish proposition 9, the affect of an increase in the 
tax rate is examined below. Proposition 3 established that 
increasing the export tax causes L and s and the (DPR) to 
decline. Equation (25) indicates that an increase in the export 
tax will not alter smuggling•s improvement of the total social 
value of exports over the strictly legal trade alternative. This 
result establishes proposition 9. 
The final issue is the case of smuggling coexisting with 
strictly legal trade. This can occur only when (P*=pl-) . If 
smuggling coexists with strictly legal trade, then the change in 
the domestic price ratio is zero and the change in the total 
social value of exports is negative as condition (25) would 
indicate for (P*=pl-) . For the situation depicted by equation 
(13) , the welfare effect is negative. However, in this case the 
existence of strictly legal trade and/or smuggling is 
indeterminate. This result mirrors the result attained in the 
paper by Bhagwati and Hansen when (P*=pl-) , and the conclusion of 
this paper concurs with their conclusion of "the less smuggling 
the better" for this case. For this case, any change in an 
exogenous variable which causes a decline in the (DPR) will 
eliminate smuggling. 
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VIII. Summary. 
The purpose of this essay is to extend the analysis of 
Bhagwati and Hansen and other economists who have made a 
contribution to a greater understanding of the economic 
consequences of illegal transactions in international trade. The 
focus of this essay is the effect of enforcement and taxes on 
smuggling, welfare, and tax revenue collection. The results of 
the model are as follows: 1) smuggling can have a strictly 
positive effect on welfare; 2) the level of enforcement, taxes, 
and the real resource cost affects the firm's decision to 
smuggle; 3) if smuggling is welfare enhancing, an increase in 
export taxes has a negative effect on joint export trade and 
welfare; 4) if the welfare effect of smuggling is positive, then 
increased government enforcement against smuggling has an 
negative effect on welfare and total exports; and if increased 
enforcement does not eliminate smuggling, then tax revenues will 
fall; 5) improvement in the terms of trade will increase the 
amount of legal and illegal goods the smuggling firm will export; 
and 6) the presence of smuggling reduces the revenue maximizing 
tax rate. 
The general conclusion of the paper is that if a country 
tries to eliminate smuggling, it may reduce welfare and tax 
receipts. If one compares the policy implications derived in this 
paper with those found in the earlier literature, it is clear 
that there is a difference in the economic impact of policy 
changes on the Pitt type of joint product smuggling as compared 
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to the Bhagwati and Hansen type of clandestine smuggling. Before 
a government decides to implement a policy in reaction to 
smuggling activity, it should be aware of which type of smuggling 
is most prevalent in its economy. 
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Appendix (A) 
The profit maximization first order conditions for equation 
(7) are, 
(la) oY = (1 -p ·F) .p f ·GL + p f . (1-t) - p• = o, aL 
(2a) oY - (1-p ·F) ·P f ·G. - p• = 0. as 
The term (Pt) ,  is the fixed international terms of trade and 
(t) is the ad valorem export tax rate. First order conditions 
(la) and (2a) state that the marginal cost of an additional unit 
of tradeable will just equal its revenue in trade, be it legal or 
illegal trade. An additional unit of legal trade will result in 
additional le?al revenue p
f • (l-t) and additional smuggling reve­
nue (1-p • F) ·P ·Gi.· 
The profit maximization second order conditions for equation 
(7) are, 
(3a) ;p.y = (1-p·F) ·P f ·Gu < o, aL2 
oY (4a) ar...as = (1-p ·F) .p f ·Gu > 0, 
(Sa) ;p.y = (1-p ·F) ·p f ·Gss < O, as2 
;p.y (6a) asaL = (1 -p•F) .p f .GSL > 0. 
The partial derivative (G.) is the marginal product of (S) 
in the production of (S*) and is assumed to be positive. The 
partial derivative (Gi.) is the marginal product of legal trade in 
production of (S*) and is assumed to be positive. The second 
order partial derivatives (G .. ) and (Gu.) are assumed to be nega-
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tive because of the concavity assumption imposed on (G). The 
cross partial derivatives, (G.L, Gt.), are assumed positive and 
small. This implies that the marginal productivity of either 
input increases if the other input is increased. The second 
order conditions for profit maximization hold when it is assumed 
that the cross partial derivatives are positive and small. 
_ f { 
( 1 -p · F) • GLL 
(7a) A - P 
( ) G 1-p ·F • SL 
(1-p ·F) • GLS] 
( F) G 
, DET (A) > 0 • 
1-p O • SS 
Under the assumption that second order conditions given in 
equation (7a) hold, profit maximization is assured for the 
smuggling firm. 
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Appendix (B) 
In order to analyze the effect of a change in the trade tax 
or a change in enforcement variables or the world price of 
exports on the smuggler's optimal level of legal exports (L) and 
illegal attempted exports (S), we have to rewrite the first order 
conditions in appendix (A) in the following style in order to 
perform a comparative static analysis, 
(2b) Z2 = (L,S; p
f, p,F, t) = (1 -p•F) ·p f • G8 - p• = 0. 
Assuming the second order conditions for a profit maximiza­
tion are satisfied, we have the following pair of implicit 
functions: 1) L = L(Pt, p, F, t); 2) s = S(Pt, p, F, t). Taking the 
total differential of (Z1) and (Z2), with respect to the endoge­
nous and exogenous variables, the following results are derived 
for dL, dS, dt, dp, dF, dPf: 
(3b) dzi = [ (1-p·F) • p f Gu ] < O, 
dL � 
(4b) ':::.; = [ (1-p • F) • p f . G.r.sl > 0, 
(Sb) 
(7b) dz1 = [ p f G ] dF p· . L > O, 
dz1 (8b) 
dP f 
= -[(1-p • F) • GL + (1-t)] < O, 
(9b) 
dz2 = 
dS [(1 -
p·F)· Pf ·G88] <O, 
dz2 (lOb) 
dL 
= [ ( 1-p • F) • Pf · G8L] > 0, 
dz2 (llb) 
dt 
= O, 
(12b) 
dz2 
= [ f ] F· P • G8 > 0, dp 
dz2 f (13b) -[p· P ·G8]> 0, dF 
( 14b) 
dz2 = [ ( ) 1 - 1-p·F ·G8 <O. 
dPf 
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Imposing the second order conditions on the Hessian matrix 
below, the determinant of the Hessian is positive. This is a 
reasonable assumption since the main diagonal matrix elements are 
negative and large -- large, that is, in comparison to the off 
diagonal elements of the matrix as described in appendix (A) . 
This assumption is used to determine the signs in the comparative 
static analysis below, 
(15b) 
L 
dzifdL 
dz2/dL 
s 
dzifdS 
dz2/dS 
+ 
= > o. 
+ 
By applying Cramer's rule the following comparative static 
results can be derived: aL/at, aL/ap, aL/aF, aL/aPt, as/aPt, 
as,at, as,ap, as,aF, 
(16b) 
(17b) 
(18b) 
(19b) 
(20b) 
(21b) 
+ + 
aLJat = o 
+ 
+ + 
+ 
+ 
+ 
L S 
+ 
+ 
< o, 
L s 
+ 
+ 
< o, 
L s 
+ 
+ 
< o, 
= 
- + 
as,at = + o 
+ 
aLJap 
I 
= 
as,ap / 
= 
+ 
as,aF = + + 
+ 
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, 
< o, 
I 
< o, 
I 
< o, 
(22b) 
(23b) 
+ 
L S 
+ 
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, 
> o. 
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Appendix (C)  
The equilibrium domestic price ratio , Equation ( 8 ) , is given 
below in ( le) . The effect of an exogenous variable change on (P*) 
is provided below. The indirect affects due to changes in the 
exogenous variables on (L)  and (S) are ambiguous. Therefore , I 
will assume the direct effect dominates. 
[ ( 1 -p · F) · P t' • (S * ) ]  + [p
t' · ( l - t) · (L} ] ( le} P • = _____ _._._....,..... _______ ___ 
(L+S) L+S) 
iJp • (2c} ap 
iJp • ( 3 c) aF 
= -
oP* (4 c) at 
( p t'. L} "' -_;...._----'- < 0 • 
(L+S) 
[ ( 1 -p · F) · (S *) ]  + [ ( 1 - t) • (L) ] = - > 0 .  
(L+S) (L+S) 
I 
I 

